The first casualty of our military actions in Libya may have been the War Powers Resolution. President Obama dealt the coup de grace to a resolution that was already mortally wounded by four decades of Congressional passivity in the face of the rise an ever more imperial executive.
Before I perform an autopsy to establish the cause of death of the War Power Resolution, we should honor its life. The War Powers Resolution rested on sound Constitutional, prudential, and strategic grounds.
The Founders and the Role of Congress in the Defense of Our Republic
Our founding Fathers’ political theory was, above all, consistently opposed to monarchical absolutism. In the 17th century, England was the scene of furious violent struggles, including the English Civil War and Glorious Revolution, against Stuart monarchism. Englishmen like John Locke argued that when all political power was concentrated in a single person or branch of government, that the result was not political society at all, but a state of nature, a state of war.
But our Founding Fathers’ distrust of excessive executive power had ancient sources. Although Hamilton advocated a stronger executive and central government than nearly any other Founder, he used the pen name Publius – the name of the Roman who overthrew the Tarquins and established the Roman Republic – in the Federalist Papers. Hamilton was not alone in drawing inspiration and guidance from Roman history. Content analysis of the writings of our Founders has found that they refer to Roman sources more often than English Republicans like Locke.
Our Founders not only drew inspiration from the founding of the Roman Republic, but learned important lessons from its demise. Our Founders understood, as did Machiavelli, that the Republic fell in part because it became embroiled in ongoing warfare requiring standing armies. From the Punic Wars onward, nearly continuous warfare forced Rome to replace its intermittedly created citizen armies with permanent standing armies, which were later replaced, more and more by standing armies which largely consisted of mercenaries and non-Romans .
These changes in the nature of the Roman military were accompanied by changes in the Roman “executive power.” In the Republic, “dictators” wielded short-lived, temporary emergency military powers to execute the Republic’s wars. But as the Republic died, and with the ascendance of Julius Caesar, temporary dictatorship under Republican control was replaced by a deified, Republican Emperor Caesar. A month before his death, Caesar was named “dictator perpetuus.” With this, the Republic was dead.
Our Founders knew well from ancient Rome and 17th century England that unbridled executive power, standing armies, and permanent executive “dictatorship” in military affairs were anathema to Republican principles. For our Founders, standing armies were the bain of liberty. Thomas Jefferson said, “Standing armies are inconsistent with [a people's] freedom and subversive of their quiet.” Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts said, “What, sir, is the use of a militia? It is to prevent the establishment of a standing army, the bane of liberty.” James Madison contended, “As the greatest danger to liberty is from large standing armies, it is best to prevent them by an effectual provision for a good militia.”[i]
Although our Founding Fathers’ republicanism and belief in legislative supremacy was deeply influenced by their fear that we not repeat Roman and English mistakes, some of their confidence in legislatures was fortuitous. Under English colonialism, the Crown retained the executive power. When colonies and their subdivisions were established, the normal form of colonial charters was collective and legislative. Consequently, when the colonies removed themselves from the colonial power and declared independence, they left the colonial governors control. Removed from control of the English executive, the colonies’ default governmental form was legislative. Legislatures are the common institutional thread from the colonial period through the Revolutionary War to the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution.
Our Founders’ view of the proper role of the legislative branch in military matters was not only informed by their fears regarding the threats posed by perpetual dictatorship, absolutism, and standing armies to Republics but also their positive experience in the Revolutionary War. The Revolutionary War proved to our founders that the legislative branch could successfully raise, organize, and reorganize armies. The relationship between the Continental Congress Washington’s military leadership foreshadows the Constitutional allocation of war powers.
In the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress raised, supported, and organized armies, and Washington served as the Commander in Chief of the armies they raised. In the period between 1775 and 1779, the Congress sent several committees to Washington, solicited his advice, and after consultations, took steps to reorganize the army. The role of the Continental Congress in this establishment and reorganization was quite detailed. See for example – http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/bdsdcc:@field(DOCID+@lit(bdsdcc04901))
Our Founders were Republican in both theory and practice. Their political theory developed in opposition to monarchical absolutism, informed by the mistakes of Roman history and English history. But our Founders had real practical experience in legislative government, in the colonial period, in the Revolutionary War, under the Articles of Confederation.
A simple prudential insight informed our Founders’ construction of the Constitution. Large standing armies are anathema to liberty because they are readily used by absolutist-minded tyrants to repress the people. Legislative supremacy, avoidance of foreign entanglements requiring long standing armies, and the prevention of permanent dictatorships arising from usurpations of power by the executive were essential ingredients of a healthy Republic. The Revolutionary War had proven to our Founders that the legislative could effectively establish, raise and organize armies, and win wars. No temporary or perpetual dictator was needed.
The Founders understood that exclusive executive control over the war power, even in the form of a temporary dictatorship, would embroil the nation in military adventures that would undermine the Republic. Their solution was to limit the military power of the President and vest most war powers in the legislative. Thus, Madison wrote, “. . . the History of all Governments demonstrates, that the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it. [The Constitution has accordingly with studied care vested the question of war to the Legislature.” James Wilson wrote, “This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man . . . to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large. . .”
The constitution that our Founders were creating was a Republic. In a Republic, the Legislative branch must be supreme. As Federalist 51 states, “In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.” The Founders’ respect for legislative supremacy finds formal architectural expression in the fact that the first Article of the Constitution is the Legislature. The sequence of the Constitution’s discussion of the powers of each of our separate branches is not random. The fact that the Legislature comes first in the Constitution is consistent with our Founders Republicanism, their respect for the Roman Republic, their familiarity with the struggles of British republicans against Stuart absolutism in the 17th century, and their experience in the Revolutionary War.
Importantly, the war powers of Congress are outlined in the Constitution before the war powers of the Executive. Under Article 1, section 8, Congress has the power to:
To declare War . . .
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
What are the war powers of the Executive? Article II, Section 2 states:
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States . . .
One doesn’t have to be a Constitutional law scholar to discern our Founders’priorities. The legislative branch is mentioned first in the Constitution, is the supreme branch of government, and has a long litany of war powers under the Constitution. The executive branch is mentioned second and has but one power; albeit an important power. One need not be a sophisticate to apprehend that the Constitution’s architecture and plain wording indicate that our Founders intended that Congress have a substantial role in our Republic’s military matters.
Nor do the two branches act in isolation. The Founders, as is well know, believed that governmental power must be divided between branches which would act as check and balanced on one another. The Federalist Papers 51 makes it clear that government must check government. “In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”
Federalist 51 stated: "TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places."
Thus, the defense power of the legislative provides a check on the defense powers of the executive. Congress has the power of the purse, the power to declare war, the power to organized armies and navies, and the President wields the sword that Congress has placed in his hand. Even Hamilton, the most executive oriented Founder, wrote in Federalist 24, “that the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the LEGISLATURE, not in the EXECUTIVE.”
The central role of Congress in military matters is evident, not only from the construction of the Constitution itself and the longer litany of Congressional war powers, but from the comments of our Founders. Jefferson wrote, “We have already given in example one effectual check to the dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body. . . .” James Madison stated, “The power to declare war, including the power of judging the causes of war, is fully and exclusively vested in the legislature . . . the executive has no right, in any case, to decide the question, whether there is or is not cause for declaring war.” William Paterson wrote, “It is the exclusive province of congress to change a state of peace into a state of war.” George Washington said, “The constitution vests the power of declaring war in Congress; therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken until after they shall have deliberated upon the subject and authorized such a measure.”[ii]
The arrangement our Founders created in military affairs is simple. The supreme legislative branch decides whether we should go to war and the executive branch executes those wars. This arrangement worked in the revolutionary period and was later written into the Constitution.
The War Powers Resolution
Fast forward to the time of the War Powers Resolution. Although Congress played a role in the ramping up of the Vietnam conflict with its unanimous support of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, by the 1970s, Congress began to doubt the wisdom of its actions. President Johnson has, at various points, greatly escalated the number of ground forces in the climate and President Nixon expanded the war’s air campaign and approved the broadening of the conflict into Cambodia. Both Johnson and Nixon based their actions on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.
By 1973, Congress was ready to reel in the President. Citing the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause, it passed the War Powers Act, over President Nixon’s veto. The state purpose of the Resolution is:
It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgement (sic) of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicate by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
To me, the heart of the War Powers resolution is its consulting and reporting provisions. Those sections provide:
CONSULTATION. SEC. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.
REPORTING Sec. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced– (1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances; (2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or (3) (A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces; (B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement
Since the passage of the Act, both Republican and Democratic President, have consulted and reported consistent with the Act. Richard Grimmet’s work on the issue lists 111 incidents of reporting consistent with the Resolution.[iii]
The seeming compliance of Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Carter and Bush with the Resolution’s consulting and reporting requirements would suggest that all is well, that Congressional efforts to redress the imbalance between Congressional and Presidential war powers has succeeded. The danger of runaway Presidential military action no longer exists.
But I would argue that the War Powers Resolution has really not been tested since its passage. First, the rapid nature of American military actions prior to the second Bush Iraq and Afghanistan wars meant that the time limits of the Resolution were seldom triggered. The real “teeth” of the War Powers Resolution, Section 5(b) have not been bared. Section 5(b) provides:
Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States.
Basically, this section requires the President to request a declaration of war or terminate military actions under the Act. But the rapid nature of many of the 111 reported military actions avoided showdowns between Presidential war making and the Resolution’s termination procedure. Indeed, Grimmet lists just two examples where some members of Congress felt that the time limitation of 5(b) had been triggered (President Clinton’s involvement in Somalia and Bosnia).[iv]
Conflict was also avoided in nearly all cases Congress has been willing to cooperate and accommodate Presidential military actions and war making. In contrast with the tough questions that Congress eventually asked about President Johnson and Nixon’s handling of the Vietnam War, Congress has tended to be accommodating, even docile in their relationship to Presidential war making. For example, President George W. Bush’s wars and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan began with reports consistent with the war powers act and have continued for eight and nine years. The time limitations of the Resolution have not been raised regarding these wars by complacent Congresses. Ongoing Congressional docility raises the question of whether it has tacitly waived its powers to terminate military actions under the Resolution.
Finally, to the extent Congress has challenged Presidential military decisions since the passage of the Resolution, the challenges have been highly partisan and of questionable legitimacy. Republicans questioned the actions of Presidents Carter, Clinton, or Obama. Democrats questioned the actions of Presidents Ford, Reagan, and the Bushes. When this partisan sniping is viewed alongside general Congressional cooperation with the executive’s military decisions, it suggests that there is little in the way of real bipartisan Congressional disagreement regarding the role of Congress and the President in military matters.
But more simply, the Executive and Legislative branches haven’t yet had the occasion to go toe to toe, as institutions, over the War Powers Resolution. The closest we have come to interbranch conflict over the Act is Congressman Bruce Campbell’s suit against President Clinton’s Yugoslavia action in Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3rd 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000). But that suit was only supported by 31 Congressman. Thus, we have not had the occasion to ascertain what would happen if a bipartisan Congress and the President clashed over military actions and the Act.
Taken together, I would argue that the War Powers resolution has really not been tested since its passage. Partisan sniping aside, Congress has generally been docile in the face of executive military decision making. The lack of bona fide institutional conflict between the executive and legislative branches since the passage of the act, mean that we have sidestepped several six million dollar questions in the period since the passage of the Act.
- What happens if the President fails and refuses to consult and report consistent with the Resolution.
- What would happen if the Resolution’s Section 5(b) time limitations were triggered but the President refused to comply, refusing to request a declaration of war and to terminate military action.
On March 21, 2011, it appeared that we might, finally, have encountered an example of a President failure to report and consult as required by the Act. On that date, President Obama sent a letter to the House Speaker and President Pro Tempe of the Senate, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, informing them that:
At approximately 3:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time, on March 19, 2011, at my direction, U.S. military forces commenced operations to assist an international effort authorized by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council and undertaken with the support of European allies and Arab partners, to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and address the threat posed to international peace and security by the crisis in Libya.
This letter is inconsistent with the Resolution. President Obama introduced forces into action on March 19 but didn’t “consult” until March 21. But the Resolution provides, “The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” Besides not consulting before introducing forces, Obama’s consultation turns the act into a mere formality.
Merely formal consultation is inconsistent with Congressional intent in the drafting of the Resolution. Grimmet says of consultation:
A considerable amount of attention was given to the definition of consultation. Rejected was the notion that consultation should be synonymous with merely being informed. Rather, consultation in this provision means that a decision is pending on a problem and that Members of Congress are being asked by the President for their advice and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their approval of action contemplated. Furthermore, for consultation to be meaningful, the President himself must participate and all information relevant to the situation must be made available.
Given the substantive requirements for consulting envisioned by Congress, President Obama’s letter of March 21, 2011 merely informed Congress of his introduction of forces.
This act of noncompliance or superficial compliance with the Act is troubling because candidate and Senator Obama vowed to act consistent with the resolution. In response to questions by Charlie Savage, then of The Boston Globe, the candidate Obama said:
Q. In what circumstances, if any, would the president have constitutional authority to bomb Iran without seeking a use-of-force authorization from Congress? (Specifically, what about the strategic bombing of suspected nuclear sites — a situation that does not involve stopping an IMMINENT threat?)
OBAMA: The President does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation.
As Commander-in-Chief, the President does have a duty to protect and defend the United States. In instances of self-defense, the President would be within his constitutional authority to act before advising Congress or seeking its consent.
As Glenn Greenwald points out, our Libya actions cannot and has not been justified on the grounds of imminent danger or self defense. As he has done on so many campaign stances, President Obama has backtracked. This reversal is not his first in the area of foreign policy, he has reversed his campaign stances on ended the wars, Gitmo, torture, and detainee trials.
It now appears that a full blown showdown over Libya and the war powers act has been averted. Subsequent to March 21, and perhaps in response to bipartisan criticisms of his alleged unilateralism, President Obama and administration officials engaged in more substantive consultations with Congress. In addition, the short lived US leadership of the coalition’s efforts, and the engagement of our forces appears to have ended.
Thus it appears that the first of our two questions above has been answered. What happens if the President fails to consult consistent with the Resolution? Congress complains and the President brings his consultative efforts into substantive compliance.
But the other question remains. What if President Obama reintroduced American forces into Libya for more than 60 days, triggered Section 5(b), but refused to terminate actions after a Congressional refusal to declare war or approve extensions under the Act. My sense is that Congress would stop funding. At that point, President Obama could either terminate his military actions or follow the example of the Stuart monarchs and President Reagan and seek funding for his was from foreign powers, circumventing Congress.
But the recent controversy over President Clinton’s Libya action is more anomalous than representative. This controversy and partisan second-guessing of President Clinton’s Somalia and Bosnia actions are hardly the norm. In most instances, including high questionable engagements like the Bush invasion of Iraq, Congress simply rolls over. It fails to ask hard questions and to get the answers that should accompany a commitment of our forces to combat. It is Congressional docility in the face of the Imperial Presidency that really killed the Act. Of the Act is dead, Congress is to blame. President Obama simply applied the coup de grace.
America’s Punic Wars
Our republican military period, is dead, the imperial approach is upon us. The War Powers Act was passed in an effort to bolster Congressional war powers, but has simply created a procedure for Congressional rubber stamping of the military decisions of our Imperial Presidency. The progressive evisceration of the War Powers resolution is a predictable consequence of our most recent “Punic Wars.” Those wars have undone the Constitutional balance of powers in the area of military affairs and war making. The War Powers Act did little to redress this imbalance.
Heeding the warnings of our Founding Fathers, America largely stayed out of foreign military entanglements in the first century of our Republic’s existence. In the 100 years after the revolution, America was involved in just two wars outside its borders (the Barbary Wars and Mexican American War). But as we emerged as a major world power, our military role expanded. In the next 120 years, we would be involved in a dozen wars. For all the protests and conflict around the Vietnam War, it did nothing to slow our military expansion. In the last 30 years, we have been involved in 6 wars. The combined time of twenty years spent in Afghanistan and Iraq exceeds the time our troops spent in World War 1, World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam combined.
Our Punic Wars have had the same impact on our Republic that they had one Rome’s. They have created a hypertrophied executive, particularly in the areas of espionage, defense, and military matters. Not surprisingly, our liberties have been compromised. The Patriot Act expanded government surveillance of American citizens, 9-11 was used to justify the trial of American civilians in military courts, and military and civilian prisoners have been deprived of speedy trials, access to counsel, and subjected to pre-conviction abuse and punishment. But perhaps worst of all our Punic Wars have altered the power balance between our branches of government. In the Bush years, Congress abdicated its oversight of our military, choosing instead to rubber stamp the President decisions to go to war and subsequent occupation.
The minor ruckus that some Congressmen raised about President Obama’s actions in Libya hardly means that Congress has taken back the war powers it rightly has under the Constitution from the Imperial Presidency. The same Congress that has questioned his limited involvement in Libya, docilely accepts his continuation of our costly, pointless occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. It is that docility that poses the greatest threat to our Constitution in this area.
